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Foreign investments are drawn to privileged investment enclaves. This 
paper examines Singapore’s low-cost manufacturing enclaves in Indonesia 
and Vietnam and presents evidence on the perceived advantages associated 
with these flagship projects. The study concludes that the location 
advantages of these Singapore-styled industrial parks in regional sites 
have been overestimated and that the potential gains from these projects 
have been overshadowed by socio-political uncertainties in the host 
environments.
INTRODUCTION
Singapore, amidst the limitations of its resource-
constrained domestic environment, has long been 
driven to leverage on global resources for economic 
growth. The liberalization of foreign investment 
controls in several Asia-Pacific economies in the 
early 1990s, as well the high growth rates that these 
economies were achieving, opened up investment 
opportunities and markets few governments could 
ignore. The opportunities presented, in turn, allowed 
Singapore to develop its external economy, or in local 
parlance, the ‘second wing’.
The main thrust of the regionalization program 
was the establishment, in emerging economies in 
the region, of industrial townships that simulate 
a ‘Singapore-styled’ business environment. The 
regionalization drive was intended to create 
economic space for local and Singapore-based 
multinationals to redistribute their resource-
dependent operations,  and to upgrade their 
operations in Singapore to higher-end activities, 
utilizing the unique set of benefits and competencies 
offered by each location.
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Singapore’s long-established stratagem of 
economic development through inward foreign direct 
investments (FDI) is well documented (Chia 1986; Pang 
1987; Rodan 1989; Regnier 1991; Huff 1995; Murray & 
Pereira 1995; Blomqvist 2001). By the early 1980s, rising 
business costs rendered it an imperative for Singapore 
to shift from labor-intensive activities towards higher 
value-added ones. Singapore’s economic planners 
sought to expand the island’s investment horizons and 
potential economic growth through an overseas direct 
investment program launched in 1988.1 Singapore-based 
firms increased their investments into the region, to 
take advantage of the growing market opportunities 
there. This is amplified in Table 1. This growth in 
outward direct investments demonstrates Singapore’s 
determination in strengthening its economic prospects 
and reaching more advanced stages of development. 
This initiative would fuel Singapore’s regionalization 
drive vis-à-vis the industrial townships or parks that 
are the subject of this paper. 
These regional sites, when developed, would 
further enhance the competitiveness of Singapore-
based companies that redistribute their resource-
dependent operations to these sites, as well as 
Singapore’s competitiveness as a high-value investment 
site with strategic linkages to the region. Singapore 
aimed to maximize the advantages proffered by each 
location and its competitiveness, by lending its own 
competitive strengths (e.g. core competencies in 
industrial infrastructural development and management) 
to the regional sites.
Increasing evidence points to limitations on firms’ 
ability to take part in local agglomeration of activity, 
which has implications for their performance. The 
importance of such localized economies is changing 
the way in which firms decide on the location of their 
investments; and this, in turn, has implications for 
public policy with regards to investment attraction. 
In the next section, this paper explores the theoretical 
considerations underpinning Singapore’s efforts in 
establishing these ‘shady’ places for foreign investments 
(Lundan 2003). This is followed by an account of 
the origins and progress of the industrial-township 
projects in Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as reflections 
TABLE 1
Singapore’s total direct investment abroad by destination
(S$million, stock as at year-end)
Destination 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
China 140 2,968 10,477 12,186 14,296 15,710 16,542
Malaysia 1,663 9,716 8,908 8,610 8,517 9,754 10,413
Hong Kong 909 6,268 8,113 7,668 10,405 8,508 9,261
Indonesia 99 4,031 6,519 4,485 5,507 5,462 6,912
United States 331 2,635 2,905 3,064 4,197 6,187 6,580
United Kingdom 187 3,297 7,678 3,276 3,387 4,903 5,768
Singapore’s total FDI 7,492 46,240 158,566 177,949 209,650 230,060 257,314
(Source: Singapore Department of Statistics)
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of how location advantages have contributed to the 
development of the individual parks. In its empirical 
analysis, the paper presents firm-level data that 
exposes the limitations for firms of so-called location 




Dunning’s OLI paradigm (1977, 1993, 1995) sought to 
provide the analytical basis for explaining the activities 
of firms situated beyond their national boundaries. 
This eclectic paradigm was used to explain the ability 
and willingness of firms to serve markets, and to look 
into the reasons for their decision to locate production 
overseas. The model suggests that, by doing so, firms 
can stay closer to the foreign markets they are currently 
serving while exploiting the concomitant benefits 
arising from the interaction of Ownership-specific 
(O) advantages, Location-specific (L) advantages, and 
Internalization-incentive (I) advantages. This creates 
an advantage over utilizing domestic production, 
exports or portfolio resource flows. The paradigm was 
reconfigured (Dunning 2000a) to constitute the ‘asset-
augmenting’ aspects of FDI and multinational enterprise 
(MNE) activity. For example, O-specific advantages 
have been divided into static and dynamic; the former 
describing the advantages possessed by a firm that 
generate income at a given point of time and the latter 
illustrating the proprietary factors that allow a firm to 
enhance its income-generating asset over time.
Dunning, amongst others, has reiterated the 
importance of the spatial dimension, i.e. location 
advantages, in affecting the competitiveness of investing 
firms. Firms’ strategic choice of location reflects not 
only the aim of transferring their resources to the host 
countries, but also of gaining access to the available 
strategic assets (Chen & Chen 1998; Dunning 1995; 
Makino & Delios 1996; Dunning, van Hoesel & Narula 
1999; Frost 2001). 
By creating an economic space for companies’ 
resource-dependent operations, the pronounced 
geographical concentration of such activity within 
that particular region will further increase the location 
incentives for firms to locate at the industrial townships 
(Scott 1996; Davis & Weinstein 1997; Dunning 1998). 
The underlying attraction of these geographic locations 
was that they offered one or more of the following 
attributes: supply of primary products/good climate/
proximity to markets, which were identified as static 
L-advantages; whereas regions in which agglomeration 
yielded scope for asset-augmenting activities (e.g. R&D) 
offered dynamic L-advantages. Given the latter’s deeply 
entrenched sources, however, the said L-advantages 
(dynamic) cannot be easily replicated elsewhere. 
Although firms may relocate knowledge and similar 
assets, those assets with a public goods or collective 
characteristic cannot be easily moved (Markusen 1996; 
Porter 1998).
Location advantages espoused by academics also 
include agglomeration benefits such as knowledge 
spillovers, specialized labor, and intermediate 
inputs (Krugman 1991; Kinoshita & Campos 2003). 
Transactional benefits of spatial proximity of firms are 
significant, especially for cases where transaction costs 
of traversing distances are high (Storper 1995; Storper 
& Scott 1995; Scott 1996; Dunning 1998). As firms’ 
core competencies become increasingly knowledge-
intensive, the location in which firms locate their 
production, organization and use of assets emerges 
as a critical competitive advantage (Dunning 2000b). 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) continue to seek 
locations (economic and institutional facilities) that 
are best utilizing their core competencies (Dunning 
1998). In determining the propitious extent in which 
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a firm strategically locates, this paper will examine 
the location of MNEs vis-à-vis Singapore’s regional 
flagships, contending that moderate success was 
achieved. It will also examine, inter alia, Singapore’s 
transborder industrialization efforts, with particular 
focus on the regionalization of Singapore-based MNEs 
(SEDB 1993a, 1993b, 1995a,1995b), and whether the 




Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP)
It had long been recognized that the Singapore–
Indonesia border zone, notably the nearby Batam, was 
capable of attracting labor-intensive industries, and 
activities with extensive space requirements that had 
close links with Singapore-based activity. However, 
it was only in the late 1980s that mutual agreement2 
could be reached by which time Singapore’s priority 
was additional production space and Indonesia was 
prepared to extend foreign investment concessions to 
jump-start Batam’s development. Foreign companies in 
Batam were exempted from the need to devolve a share 
of ownership to Indonesian partners, and the island’s 
duty-free status was amended to facilitate a proportion 
of output to be exported to other parts of Indonesia. As 
well, foreign companies were allowed to develop and 
manage industrial estates. This presented an opportunity 
for Singapore to develop its first transborder industrial-
township project, Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP). 
BIP started as a joint venture between Singapore’s 
government-linked companies (GLCs)
3
 and Indonesia’s 
Salim Group.4 Salim was Indonesia’s largest business 
conglomerate, with close links to senior politicians and 
with privileged access to the major investment projects 
in the Riau Islands (Sato 1993; Hill 1996). The roles as 
allocated between the Singaporean GLCs and Salim 
were distinctly separated. Singaporean GLCs were 
given control over the development and management of 
the Park, while Salim’s role was to facilitate operations 
and to provide a guarantee of priority in relation to 
regulatory controls and administrative approvals. 
Singapore’s reputation for transparent and efficient 
management of projects lent further credibility to 
the projects and maximized marketing leverage over 
Singapore-based multinationals.
The strategic thrust of the flagship project was 
to get investors to look at Singapore and the Riau 
Islands, each at different stages of development, as a 
single investment region, and not as separate states 
competing for investments. Singapore, for instance, can 
support business operations dependent on advanced 
technology and sophisticated services, while low-
value, labor-intensive industries can be located in 
Riau. Specialization in this way is designed to attract 
investment by enabling investors to retain activities 
in close proximity while making use of contrasting 
environments i.e. complementary specialization in 
national border territories (Yeoh, Goh & Chong 1993). 
In the process, these firms, with their various activities 
located in close proximity, also reap the economies of 
agglomeration suggested by location theories.
BIP’s first tenants arrived in 1991, mainly 
subsidiaries of American, European and Japanese 
multinationals already operating in Singapore. By July 
2003, there were 82 companies and 65,000 workers in 
the Park (Table 2a, opposite). Out of total employment 
of 65,000, over 85% were female, most aged from 18 
to 22 years. Investment commitment is in excess of 
US$1 billion, with a strong presence of 39 Japanese 
firms in the Park as compared to the 25 Singaporean 
firms. American and European investors have a limited 
presence (Table 2b, opposite). There is a concentration 
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TABLE 2a 
BIP—operational statistics  
(June 2003)
General Information
Investment by developer US$470 million
Committed tenants 82
Area taken up 320 hectares
Investment by tenants > US$1 billion
Annual export value (2002) > US$2 billion
No. of employees 65,000
(Source: SembCorp Parks Management)
of electronics operations, mainly various component 
assembly processes, and supporting activities to the 
electronics sector such as plastic molding and packaging 
(Table 2c). 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park 
(VSIP)
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam, 
replicating a Singapore-styled, industrial park 
environment. The 1,000-hectare Park is located in Binh 
Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City 
and a 40-minute drive from the international airport and 
seaports. A self-sufficient industrial park with prepared 
land plots and ready-built factories, bolstered by 
Singapore-style management expertise, VSIP provides 
a one-stop service to its tenants. Other VSIP location 
advantages include an on-site customs unit, which 
allows the convenience of customs procedures and 
documentation to be done within the Park, and customs 
inspections within tenant’s factories. Skilled labor is 
provided by the S$9.5 million Vietnam–Singapore 
Technical Training Centre (VSTTC) established in 1998, 
which is a project between the Singapore and Vietnam 
governments, and VSIP. A 200,000 working population 
within a 15-km radius from VSIP provides another 
ready pool of low-cost, skilled labor.
The VSIP project was based on the perception 
that Singapore agencies have a competitive edge in 
infrastructure development and, like the Suzhou–Wuxi 
‘experiments’ in China, had a pseudo-economic 
objective to demonstrate the transferability of the 
BIP-prototype to other regional sites. Here, Singapore 
applied lessons learned from its China experience, and 
made deliberate efforts to foster strong collaboration 
with local authorities. A Management Board
5
 was set 
up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong 
TABLE 2c 
BIP—tenant profile by sector 
 (June 2003)
Sector % Sector %
Electronics 44 Packaging 6
Precision Parts 15 Medical 4
Plastic molding 10 Pharmaceuticals 1
Electrical 11 Others 9
(Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003)
TABLE 2b 







(Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003)
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Province People’s Committee, which pre-empted the 
perception that VSIP was a partnership forced upon 
the province by the central government. VSIP is jointly 
developed by a Singapore consortium led by SembCorp 
Industries
6 and Becamex, a state-owned enterprise. 
VSIP’s early tenants included 3M, Sandoz, 
Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food Industries 
(Philippines) and a mix of Singapore manufacturers 
like ST Automotive, Star Chemicals and Hwa Hup. 
Cumulative investment commitments topped US$400 
million from 33 companies in 1999. Most of the tenants 
are from Singapore, Japan and Taiwan, reflecting 
the importance of Asian MNEs, while the sector 
mix reflects a broad swathe of industries, including 
food, electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals and 
healthcare, speciality materials, consumer goods and 
light industries.
7
 Compared to BIP, VSIP is less selective 
of target industries. Investment commitments in VSIP 
are currently valued at over US$600 million from 124 
tenants, 80 of which are in operation. Twenty-four 
thousand jobs have been created, with the number 
expected to rise to 40,000. VSIP posted its first profits of 
US$4 million in 2002. Tables 3a, 3b and 3c  provide more 
information on the operational statistics of VSIP.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Prior analyses of the Parks have relied primarily on 
secondary data from official publications, press reports 
and other such sources. To add empirical rigor to this 
paper, the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, 
Perry and Lim (2000) was applied to the tenants in BIP 
and VSIP to gauge the differential impact of various 
push/pull factors on firms’ decision to locate in the 
case-study Parks, along with the differential impact of 
different types of constraints on their operations. The 
first set of questions sought to determine the profile 
of the respondents: type of ownership, nature of 
TABLE 3a
VSIP—operational statistics  
(Sept. 2003)
General Information
Investment by developer US$600 million
Committed tenants 124 
Area taken up 300 hectares
Investment by tenants > US$1 billion
Annual export value (2002) > US$2 billion
No. of employees 24,000
(Source: SembCorp Parks Management)
TABLE 3b






Other Asian Countries 22
US and Europe 16
(Source: SembCorp Parks Management)
TABLE 3c
VSIP—tenant profile by sector  
(Sept. 2003)
Sector % Sector %
Electronics 11 Consumer goods 14
Food 9 Logistics 14
Light industries 20 Parts and components 10
Pharmaceuticals 9 Others 13
(Source: SembCorp Parks Management)
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operations and size of establishment; and the second set 
was structured to gather information on the push/pull 
factors affecting the tenants. Other data pertaining to 
the respondents’ views on the facilities and services in 
the Parks were culled from the open-ended questions. 
On-site interviews were undertaken in August 2002 
(VSIP), and in December 2002 and July 2003 (BIP). The 
following section presents the survey results.
Profile of Respondents 
Of the 50 respondent firms, 27 (54%) were from 
BIP, and 23 (46%) were from VSIP. Of the 27 BIP 
respondent firms, 7 were wholly Singapore-owned, 5 
were Singapore joint ventures with foreign countries, 
and 15 were wholly foreign-owned (of which 11 were 
wholly Japan-owned). In terms of the BIP respondents’ 
operations, 14 manufactured intermediate products and 
7 were engaged in consumer products. The remaining 
6 firms were involved in industrial services. In terms of 
employment size, 13 firms hired less than 500 employees 
(small) and 14 hired more than 500 employees (large). 
For VSIP, 6 respondent firms were wholly 
Singapore-owned, 1 was a joint-venture and 16 were 
wholly foreign-owned companies. There were 15 small 
firms and 8 large firms. As for the nature of operations, 
8 manufactured consumer products, 3 manufactured 
intermediate products, and 2 were involved in industrial 
services. None of the companies surveyed were 
manufacturers of capital goods. 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results
The (cumulative) logistic distribution function, 
estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the 
following form:
 P Z Zi i i= ( ) + ( ) exp exp1
where: Pi  is the probability of firm i  choosing the 
factor in question,
exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and
Zi  is a linear function of the firm attributes
 
defined as 
 Z F Li = + +α α α0 1 2
where: F = 1  if wholly foreign-owned, 0 otherwise
L = 1 if large, 0 otherwise
�α0  = constant term
�α i  = coefficient of independent (explanatory) 
variable
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit 
model is positive and statistically significant (as 
indicated by the z-statistics and p-values), this would 
imply that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-
owned) choosing a particular factor is greater than the 
probability of another firm (of different ownership 
type) making the choice, after taking into consideration 
the size of the firms. 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ 
Decision to Invest in BIP/VSIP
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development 
expertise and the low-cost labor available in the 
host environments to market its industrial parks. 
It supplements these purported advantages with its 
political commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated 
by the many bilateral agreements between the GLCs 
and host governments, or politically linked business 
conglomerates. Furthermore, there is a host of 
investment incentives that entice multinationals to 
locate their lower value-added activities in these self-
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contained investment enclaves (see Table 4a  and Table 
4b, opposite). 
Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient 
Singapore-styled infrastructure was the Parks’ main 
draw, with 85% and 70% of the BIP and VSIP tenants 
surveyed, respectively, citing it as a pull factor for 
them to locate in the Park. Singapore appears to have 
succeeded in exporting its ‘expertise’ in infrastructure 
development and creating a location advantage that 
is clearly in demand by companies in the South East 
Asian region. 
Political commitment from the Singapore 
government was a major consideration for BIP’s 
wholly Singapore-owned or joint-venture companies, 
when compared to the foreign-owned companies. 
This is suggested by the negative and statistically 
significant α1  (=-2.8). This is not unexpected, as the 
Singapore government played a crucial role in goading 
Singapore-controlled companies to further enhance 
their competitiveness by redistributing their resource-
dependent operations to regional sites like BIP. Large 
companies in BIP were also more likely to choose 
political commitment from the Singapore government as 
one of the factors, indicated by positive and statistically 
significant�α2  (=2.548). This result affirms the role 
played by the Singapore Economic Development Board 
(SEDB) in the marketing and promotion of the Park, 
and specifically, as a ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge 
arbitrageur’, in encouraging foreign multinationals to 
redistribute lower-end operations to the industrial park 
(SEDB 1993a, 1993b, 1995a, 1995b). 
Wholly Singapore-owned or joint-venture 
companies, compared to foreign-owned companies, also 
indicated a strong need for political commitment from 
the Indonesian government, as suggested by a negative 
and statistically significant α1 (=-2.089). These results, 
taken together, can be explained by the instability of 
Indonesia’s political system. Since Suharto was made 
to step down in 1998, the presidential position has 
changed hands several times, from Habibie, to the first 
TABLE 4a
Factors influencing respondents’ decisions to invest in BIP and VSIP
(popular ranking)
Variables BIP VSIP
Frequency Rank Frequency Rank
Political commitment from the Singapore government 17 4 3 6
Political commitment from the host country government 21 3 7 4
Investment incentives 16 5 12 2
Competitive labor costs 22 2 11 3
Reliable infrastructure facilities 23 1 16 1
Availability of skilled/educated labor 16 5 6 5
(Source: Questionnaire surveys)
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elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid; and then to 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, on the impeachment of her 
predecessor. Key economic positions were reshuffled 
and economic advisors changed frequently, as power 
jockeying continued among the parties, ministries, 
legislature, central bank and other institutions. Foreign 
firms were more likely to have diversified their risks by 
locating their operations across several countries, and 
could afford to attach less importance to the Indonesian 
government’s commitment to the project. 
For VSIP, this study’s statistical tests did not 
pick up any discernible difference in the reactions of 
the companies, differentiated by type of ownership or 
employment size, to the push/pull variables.
Constraints Faced by Respondents’ 
Operations 
BIP and VSIP are now established industrial estate 
developments, but this study alludes to some emerging 
constraints that have undermined the attractiveness 
of the Parks (see Tables 5a, p. 52 and 5b, p. 53). The 
constraints are categorized into three broad groups, 
namely, those relating to labor, organization and 
technology; and the ‘environment’, such as government 
policies and regulations. 
A case in point, the ‘cheap’ labor resources that 
drew companies to BIP proved to be mere perception, 
TABLE 4b
Factors influencing respondents’ decisions to invest in BIP and VSIP
(maximum likelihood estimates—binary logits)
Variables BIP VSIP
Foreign Large Foreign Large
Political commitment from the 
Singapore government
-2.8 2.548 0.37 -0.218
(0.029)* (0.039)* (0.792) (0.877)
Political commitmentfrom the host 
country government
-2.089 1.458 -0.084 -0.371
(0.097)** (0.175) (0.933) (0.728)
Investment incentives 0.283 0.017 -0.203 -0.051
(0.804) (0.988) (0.828) (0.958)
Competitive labor costs -1.583 0.894 -1.661 0.870
(0.201) (0.403) (0.113) (0.41)
Reliable infrastructural facilities 0.035 1.355 0.529 -0.730
(0.975) (0.277) (0.613) (0.489)
Availability of skilled/educated labor -0.899 0.209 0.529 -0.259
(0.307) (0.806) (0.613) (0.812)
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
n.c. non-convergence
Notes:  Estimated values were taken from ‘forced entry’ regression; values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.
Source: Questionnaire surveys.
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as ‘rising labor costs’ was the main constraint faced by 
the majority (78%) of the BIP tenants surveyed. To add 
to the tenant’s high overheads, BIP’s Singapore-styled 
infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved 
to be costly, as facilities such as the power plant, waste-
treatment system and water supply are independently 
managed, with 74% of respondents citing it as a 
constraint they faced. In marked contrast, shortages 
of professionals and managers, and other skilled labor, 
were the main concerns of the VSIP respondents.
‘Impact of host government regulations’ and 
‘competition from overseas competitors’ are constraints 
TABLE 5a
Major constraints on respondents’ operations in BIP and VSIP
(by popular ranking)
Variables BIP VSIP
Frequency Rank Frequency Rank
Labor constraints
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor 11 7 12 2
Shortage of professionals and managers 10 9 17 1
Rising labor costs 21 2 1 13
Industrial relations problems 17 5 0 14
Others 4 11 4 11
Organizational and technological constraints
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 5 10 6 6
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques 11 7 5 7
Lack of good supporting services 13 6 5 7
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 4 11 2 12
High and/or rising overhead costs 20 4 5 7
Others 0 14 5 7
Environmental constraints
Impact of host government regulations 24 1 11 3
Competition from overseas competitors 21 2 11 3
Others 1 13 7 5
(Source: Questionnaire surveys)
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TABLE 5B
Major constraints on respondents’ operations in BIP and VSIP
(maximum likelihood estimates—binary logits)
Variables BIP VSIP
Foreign Large Foreign Large
Labor constraints
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor -0.758 0.33 1.661 -0.87
(0.353) (0.686) (0.113) (0.410)
Shortage of professionals and managers 0.201 0.488 1.332 0.712
(0.807) (0.552) (0.220) (0.586)
Rising labor costs 0.457 -0.879 n.c. n.c.
(0.635) (0.377)
Industrial relations problems 0.232 0.722 n.c. n.c.
(0.778) (0.381)
Others -0.255 -0.041 -2.034 0.382
(0.817) (0.971) (0.157) (0.800)
Organizational and technological constraints
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c.
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques -1.398 1.398 -0.904 1.797
(0.145) (0.145) (0.493) (0.166)
Lack of good supporting services -1.001 -0.184 0.316 -1.061
(0.243) (0.830) (0.777) (0.413)
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion -1.161 -1.161 n.c. n.c.
(0.358) (0.358)
High and/or rising overhead costs n.c. n.c. 0.316 -1.061
(0.777) (0.413)
Others n.c. n.c. -0.196 -0.370
(0.864) (0.748)
Environmental constraints
Impact of host government regulations n.c. n.c. -2.409 -2.188
(0.058)** (0.088)**
Competition from overseas competitors 0.889 -0.582 2.363 2.775
(0.393) (0.587) (0.065)** (0.038)*
Others 18.029 18.153 -0.678 1.272
(0.999) (0.999) (0.500) (0.312)
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
n.c. non-convergence
Notes: Estimated values were taken from ‘forced entry’ regression; values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.
(Source: Questionnaire surveys)
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highlighted by the tenants in both case-study parks. 
However, whereas 89% and 78% of BIP tenants 
respectively cited the above two constraints, only 
about half of the VSIP tenants indicated likewise. 
From the logit analysis, VSIP tenants that are wholly 
Singapore-owned or joint-venture (compared to the 
foreign-owned) companies, and small companies 
were more likely to select ‘impact of host government 
regulation’ as the major constraint they encountered, 
as shown by the negative and statistically significant �
α1  and α2 (-2.409 and -2.188, respectively). However, 
foreign-owned (as compared to Singapore-owned 
and joint-venture) companies and large companies 
in VSIP were more likely to consider ‘competition 
from overseas competitors’ as their major constraint, 
as indicated by positive and statistically significant 
α1  (=2.363) and α2  (=2.775). Taken together, these 
results indicate that Singapore-controlled companies 
in VSIP, with their smaller scale of operations, are 
more vulnerable to vagaries associated with changes 
in host government regulations, while competition 
from overseas competitors would be less pronounced 
as they are mainly supporting industries to the large 
firms and/or supplying to the domestic markets. 
The larger, wholly foreign-owned companies, with 
more resources, would arguably be less perturbed by 
host government regulations, but competition from 
industry competitors overseas would certainly be a 
preoccupation.
CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT
On a broader front, BIP’s competitiveness has been 
eroded with the mushrooming of other industrial parks, 
some within close proximity. A few of the competitor 
parks, backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, 
are rapidly developing to match its standards. Panbil 
Industrial Park, for instance, is located directly opposite 
BIP, and offers similar factories at competitive rentals. 
The premium placed on the Parks’ formulaic one-
stop support service, and self-sufficient operating 
environment, is increasingly being called into question 
(Yeoh, Lim & Kwan 2004).
BIP has increasingly become a Japanese investment 
enclave (Perry & Yeoh 2000), and faces the problem of 
squatter settlements scattered throughout the island, 
which have introduced tensions and social problems to 
BIP (Peachey, Perry & Grundy-Warr 1998). Regional 
autonomy laws, introduced by the Habibie government, 
have added longer-term uncertainties to BIP’s operating 
environment. Preliminary evidence points to a more 
complex regulatory environment, as foreign companies 
(including Singapore GLCs) now have to deal with 
provincial and sub-provincial governments much 
more intensively than during the Soeharto era. These 
problems have been further exacerbated by rising labor 
costs and frequent labor disputes; and complicated by 
Indonesia’s uncertain legal system, all of which has 
resulted in more than 100 foreign companies (of which 
40% are Japanese) reportedly pulling out of Indonesia 
and relocating to China, Vietnam and Malaysia (The 
Singapore Business Times, 28 Aug. 2003). This investor 
exodus has impacted on the positioning of BIP as an 
investment enclave, and could act as a deterrent for 
potential investors. 
BIP’s reputation has also not been left unscathed 
by political developments in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, the 11 September attacks in the United 
States, the Bali bomb blasts and, more recently, the 
Iraq War. In addition, the negative press reports on 
active terrorist cells within the region do little to abate 
potential investors’ lack of confidence or innate risk-
aversion attitudes. BIP could do without these added 
uncertainties.
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VSIP, not unlike BIP, has to contend with intense 
competition from neighboring industrial parks. Viet 
Huong Industrial Park, Song Than 1 and 2, for instance, 
offer ‘no frills’ services, and bring into scrutiny the 
premium attached to the Singapore-styled industrial 
parks. These competing industrial parks may not match 
the infrastructure and facilities provided by VSIP, but 
they are a threat on price, charging only a fraction of 
VSIP’s ‘packaged’ fees. As well, experienced and street-
savvy industrial-park developers from Taiwan and 
Korea have similarly eroded VSIP’s competitiveness, 
while tight market conditions have forced some VSIP 
tenants to seek cheaper alternatives.
The ‘special’ support from the local authorities 
has also proved to be less significant than initially 
thought. Improvements on infrastructural projects have 
translated into higher toll charges and miscellaneous 
fees, all of which have added to the tenants’ operating 
costs. In addition, despite the keen interest from the 
Vietnamese in welcoming Singapore investments, and 
transfers of technology and skills, some tensions have 
arisen owing to Singapore’s ‘control’ and management 
of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that bureaucratic 
red-tape and corruption remain endemic. These nuances, 
and a dearth of local administrative support, have acted 
in tandem to erode the location-specific advantages that 
VSIP touts, limiting the benefits that firms investing in 
VSIP would otherwise have received. 
CONCLUSION
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a 
comparatively short period of time testifies to the ability 
of Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilize 
economic and political resources to create economic 
space for the city-state. The projects, in addition to 
the natural location advantages imbued in each Park, 
have obtained special investment conditions within 
their overseas localities, and government endorsements 
that further underline the significance of the projects. 
On the other hand, Singapore’s overseas parks exist as 
investment enclaves within a disjointed economic and 
policy environment.
In Indonesia, BIP is now a well-established project, 
but it has not necessarily achieved all its development 
goals. It has been a springboard for Singapore–Indonesia 
co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear that 
Singapore has obtained the resource benefits looked for. 
In both Parks, location advantages such as low labor 
costs and tax incentives have aided in attracting and 
retaining investors. However, BIP may be at risk from 
the breakdown of the industrial township as a separate 
enclave, and from the larger social tensions existing on 
Batam. Singapore’s ‘experiment’ in Indonesia has been 
successful in exploiting some of the location advantages 
available, but faces ongoing challenges in becoming an 
economically viable project. The political uncertainties, 
post-9/11 and in the wake of the Bali-Jakarta bombings, 
as well as policy nuances that radiate from Jakarta, have 
had detrimental effects on investor confidence.
In Vietnam, Singapore’s investment in VSIP takes 
on an added dimension of rendering development 
assistance to an Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) partner, overtly to foster greater bilateral ties. 
It is apparent from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries, and 
the style of park management and operations, that the 
intention is for the local partners to have a stronger sense 
of ‘ownership’ of the project. Also, the focus on specific 
industries that complement Singapore’s economic 
restructuring, characteristic of the BIP initiative, is 
absent here. Notwithstanding the explicit or implicit 
objectives, intense market competition, and the inherent 
problems of corruption act as constraints to the location 
advantages that firms would otherwise receive, and 
work in tandem to test this strategic initiative.
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In summary, the Singapore government’s role 
in developing, managing and operating the overseas 
industrial parks has been crucial from the start. However, 
initial assumptions of the location advantages engendered 
by the differing locations of the industrial parks were 
overly optimistic. Differing agendas, sometimes within 
the same host government, intertwined with the cultural 
and political complexities of large economies, and the 
uncontrolled external environment, serve to diminish 
the competitiveness of the case-study Parks. The limits 
of inducing location advantages, beyond demarcated 
geographical boundaries, have been exposed in this 
paper.
*We are grateful for the funding of this research by the 
Wharton-SMU Research Center.
ENDNOTES
1. The main ideas were set out in the policy document, 
‘Gearing up for an enhanced role in the global economy’ 
(SEDB 1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added 
new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB 1990).
2. Singapore’s vision of the role of Batam differed from the 
Indonesian ambition, which was to create a diversified modern 
metropolis comparable to Singapore. Singapore’s economic 
planners envisaged Batam as a relocation point for low-value 
assembly activity (Liew 1990). However, after Indonesia’s own 
efforts to promote Batam had brought few results, there was a 
willingness to compromise development objectives, especially 
as BIP promised to leverage other investments under the 
larger growth triangle initiative for which it became the key 
flagship project (Perry 1991; Yeoh, Lau, Goh & Richardson 
1992; Peachy, Perry & Grundy-Warr 1998). 
3. The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore 
Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp 
Industries) and Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore’s main 
industrial estate infrastructure developer.
4. The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business 
practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas 
Chinese’ (Redding 1990; Yeung 1997; Brown 1998; Lehman 
1998), which Singapore capitalized on in its industrial park 
in Indonesia. 
5. The Board, with representatives from the ministries of 
Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as from the General 
Customs Department, oversees the issue of investment 
licences, import/export permits, and construction permits.
6. Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, 
JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, Salim’s KMP 
Group, LKN Construction, and MC Development Asia.
7. VSIP has a list of ‘priority’ industries, which adheres closely 
to the official list of preferred industries. Details are given in 
Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited 
Industries in Export Processing Zones and High-Technology 
Industrial Zones, issued on 29 July, 1997.
8. This is equivalent to Zi = �0 - �1F’ - �2 L’ where F’=1 if not 
wholly foreign-owned, 0 otherwise, and L’=1 if not large, 0 
otherwise and �0 is another constant term.
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